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The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right
STEPHEN I. VLADECK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The central point of disagreement between the majority and dis-
senting opinions in the D.C. Circuit in Boumediene v. Bush,' the latest in
a series of challenges to the detention of noncitizen "enemy combatants"
at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, is the question whether the Constitution's
Suspension Clause2 applies in Guantdnamo. Following the logic of
Judge Robertson's opinion for the D.C. District Court in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld,3 the majority in Boumediene concluded that the Suspension
Clause does not protect noncitizens outside the territorial United States.4
As such, the court of appeals held that the Clause does not apply to the
Guantdnamo detainees, and that the Military Commissions Act of 2006
("MCA"),5 section 7 of which purports to divest the federal courts of
jurisdiction over the detainees' habeas petitions,6 is therefore constitu-
tional (or "not unconstitutional," to use the more logical but less gram-
matically correct description).7
In a stringent dissent, Judge Rogers argued to the contrary that it is
illogical to read the Suspension Clause as anything other than a global
limitation on Congress's power in all cases, citizen or not, extraterrito-
* Associate Professor, American University, Washington College of Law. Associate
Professor (2005-2007), University of Miami School of Law. This article was prepared in
conjunction with the University of Miami Law Review's Spring 2007 symposium, "Article II: The
Uses and Abuses of Executive Power," for my participation in which I owe thanks to Lisa Iglesias
and Kelly Feig.
By way of disclosure, I am coauthor of an amicus brief in support of the Petitioners in
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007), and Al Odah
v. United States, 476 F.3d 981, cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3067 (2007), currently pending before the
Supreme Court. See Brief of Federal Courts and International Law Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2007), 2007 WL
2441588.
I. 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
3. 464 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006).
4. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 988-92.
5. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28 &
42 U.S.C.).
6. Id. § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2635-36 ("No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear
or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by
the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as
an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.").
7. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 988-94.
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rial or not.8 In particular, Judge Rogers seized upon the placement of
the Clause in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution-alongside other
structural limitations on Congress's power, including the Ex Post Facto
and Bill of Attainder Clauses.9 Because we would never think of defin-
ing those provisions by either their territorial application or the citizen-
ship of those subjected to laws enacted in violation thereof, the argument
goes, we should similarly not embrace such a stilted view of the Suspen-
sion Clause. Thus, from Judge Rogers's perspective, the relevant ques-
tion is not whether the Suspension Clause applies, but whether section 7
of the MCA runs afoul of that constitutional provision.1" And so, the
point of departure in the D.C. Circuit-and one key facet of the cases
now pending before the Supreme Court-is whether the "right"
enmeshed within the Suspension Clause is "structural" or "individual."1
As currently framed, this debate simply cannot have a definitive
answer. Some provisions of the Constitution are clearly "structural";
others are clearly "individual." 12 The line dividing the two is elusive at
best, if not downright illusory, and supporters of both views of the Sus-
pension Clause can marshal support for the notion that the Clause falls
on either side. But regardless of the category into which one places the
Suspension Clause, it seems completely uncontroversial to conclude that
the contemporary debate has been framed entirely in these terms.
And therein lies the rub.
Regardless of ideology, the Founders would have been surprised at
the strange doctrinal path that the Suspension Clause has taken. At the
8. See id. at 994-98, 987 n.3.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
10. See, e.g., Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 996-98.
11. A separate argument in the Guantdnamo cases, and one that may curry particular favor
with Justice Kennedy, is that GuantAnamo is "different"-that owing to the nature of the United
States' control over the base, it is not quite as "extraterritorial" as other installations elsewhere in
the world. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory, and it is one
far removed from any hostilities.... What matters is the unchallenged and indefinite control that
the United States has long exercised over Guantanamo Bay. From a practical perspective, the
indefinite lease of Guantanamo Bay has produced a place that belongs to the United States,
extending the 'implied protection' of the United States to it.") (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950)). See generally Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003) (making
a variation of this argument).
Since there is little question that the Suspension Clause does protect noncitizens within the
territory of the United States, see, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 293, 305 (2001), the
Supreme Court could conceivably sidestep deeper questions about the extraterritorial applicability
of the Suspension Clause simply by holding that Guantinamo is not "really" extraterritorial. Of
course, such a holding does nothing to solve the applicability of the Clause to noncitizens detained
elsewhere, including in Iraq and Afghanistan.
12. For a discussion of this issue solely in the context of Article III of the Constitution, see
Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and Article III, 95 GEo.
L.J. 1497, 1541-45 & n.226 (2007).
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1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and during the ratifica-
tion debates that followed, the Clause was understood by both the Con-
stitution's supporters and detractors as a grant of authority to the federal
government-to do away with the "privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus" in certain emergency situations when "the public Safety may
require it."'13  Thus, the name of the provision-the "Suspension"
Clause. The idea that Congress could do away with habeas was one of
the catalyzing agents behind what would become the Bill of Rights, and
the conclusion that the Clause affirmatively granted authority to the fed-
eral government was a keystone of the Federalists' defense of the Con-
stitution as written.
14
And so, the "original understanding" of the Suspension Clause was
as the exception to the rule-as delineating those narrow and express
cases where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus could be infringed
upon.15 Simply put, the Suspension Clause did not create a "structural
right"; it provided structural constitutional underpinnings for the com-
mon-law right that already existed, and specified the only instances in
which that right could be abridged.
16
On this view, both readings of the Suspension Clause in the D.C.
Circuit's Boumediene decision are incorrect because both presuppose
that the relevant question is how the Clause limits Congress. Entirely to
the contrary, the Clause specifies the circumstances wherein Congress
can act to preclude access to the courts, and recognizes that habeas, at
least "as it existed in 1789, ''17 is otherwise available to those detained in
violation of federal law; it expressly "protects" no one.18 Thus, the cen-
13. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 128 (1980)
(quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 438 (Max Farrand, ed. 1966)).
For a succinct contemporary reconstruction, see ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS:
RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 12-19 (2001). See generally Jonathan L. Hafetz, Note,
The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996 Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J.
2509 (1998) (reviewing the common-law origins of habeas corpus).
14. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 17-19.
15. As one scholar has argued, the real purpose of the Clause was to limit Congress's power
to take away habeas in state courts. See DUKER, supra note 13, at 126-35.
16. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1510
(1987) ("The common law would furnish the cause of action that assured judicial review; the
Constitution would furnish the test on the legal merits of confinement.").
17. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300-01 (2001) ("[Riegardless of whether the
protection of the Suspension Clause encompasses all cases covered by the 1867 Amendment
extending the protection of the writ to state prisoners, or by subsequent legal developments, at the
absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ 'as it existed in 1789.'") (quoting
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996)) (citations and footnote omitted).
18. Thus, as one recent article suggests, courts entertaining habeas petitions need only resolve
whether the government has the legal authority to hold the detainee, without reaching any deeper
questions about the detainee's substantive individual rights. See Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas
Without Rights, 2007 Wis. L. REv. (forthcoming).
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tral thesis of this essay is that the view of the Suspension Clause "as a
structural right" is, in fact, another version of the long-recognized (if
currently underappreciated) view of the Suspension Clause as creating
no rights whatsoever, but merely empowering Congress to do away with
the writ of habeas corpus only when exigency demands.
This argument, of course, is not without its own difficulties. After
summarizing the original understanding, Part II considers its first poten-
tial shortcoming-that no less a figure than Chief Justice Marshall wrote
in 1807 that federal jurisdiction over habeas is entirely a creature of
statute.19 Marshall's dicta in Ex parte Bollman implied (and has subse-
quently been read as suggesting2° ) that the writ would not have existed
without section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,21 a conclusion strongly
at odds with the notion that the Suspension Clause recognizes (and con-
stitutionalizes) the preexisting availability of common-law habeas.
As Part II notes, the critical point missing from our contemporary
understanding of Bollman is that federal habeas was generally available
in state courts from the Founding to-and even through-the Civil
War.22 Thus, even if Marshall meant what he said in Bollman, he was
speaking only to the question of federal court habeas on top of what
would have been available in state court. That is to say, Marshall's dic-
tum did not suggest that there would have been no habeas for federal
prisoners without section 14 of the Judiciary Act; it suggested that there
would have been no habeas in the lower federal courts, a result that,
given the availability of state-court review, would not have raised sub-
stantial Suspension Clause concerns.23
19. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94-95 (1807).
20. See infra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's reading of Bollman).
21. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
22. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 18 ("However odd the notion may appear to
modem lawyers, contemporaries all assumed that the state courts would be able to issue writs of
habeas corpus to release those in federal custody."); see also id. at 159 n.21. See generally Todd
E. Pettys, State Habeas Relief for Federal Extrajudicial Detainees, 92 MtNN. L. RaV. 265, 270-81
(2007) (summarizing state courts' antebellum experience with federal habeas petitions). For some
of Pettys's examples of state-court cases considering federal habeas claims, see Commonwealth v.
Downes, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 227 (1836); State v. Dimick, 12 N.H. 194 (1841); United States v.
Wyngall, 5 Hill 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); and Commonwealth ex rel. Webster v. Fox, 7 Pa. 336
(1847).
23. For example, in Felker, the Supreme Court upheld the "gatekeeper" provisions of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 40, 42, 49 & 50
U.S.C.), even though the provisions took away appellate jurisdiction over second and successive
habeas petitions where the petitioner did not receive permission to appeal. See Felker v. Turpin,
518 U.S. 651, 654 (1996). The crux of Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning for the majority was
that the gatekeeper provisions raised no Suspension Clause issue because they left intact the
Court's jurisdiction over "original" habeas petitions. See id. at 663-64. Thus, the preclusion of
federal jurisdiction over some aspect of a habeas petition does not implicate the Suspension
[Vol. 62:275
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Moreover, by 1872, when the Supreme Court finally repudiated
habeas for federal prisoners in the state courts in Tarble's Case,24 Con-
gress had enacted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,25 which effectively
provided for federal court jurisdiction over any habeas petition alleging
detention in violation of federal statutes, federal treaties, or the federal
Constitution.26 Thus, by a twist of fate, the constitutional problem that
Tarble would otherwise have caused (this one,27 anyway) had already
been solved. And whatever one might say about Tarble's logic or ratio-
nale, it could not have been lost on the Justices that the lower federal
courts on whom they were foisting all subsequent federal habeas peti-
tions had statutory jurisdiction to issue the writ, the scope of which
likely matched (if not exceeded) the common-law authority to issue the
writ that the state courts had previously possessed. Thus, as Part II con-
cludes, Marshall's dictum was anachronistic, written during a time when
the absence of federal jurisdiction would not have meaningfully impli-
cated the availability of habeas corpus in some forum.
The harder challenge to this essay's thesis, 8 to which I turn in Part
III, is what to make of the Supreme Court's case law with respect to the
extraterritorial availability of habeas corpus, particularly its 1950 deci-
sion in Johnson v. Eisentrager29 (which precluded access to the writ for
enemy aliens overseas),3" and subsequent decisions taking no issue with
extraterritorial invocations of the writ by U.S. citizens. 3' Some scholars
have seized upon Eisentrager and its progeny, in conjunction with the
Clause unless it precludes access to the courts altogether. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372,
381 (1977) ("[Tlhe substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective
to test the legality of a person's detention does not constitute a suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.").
24. See 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 407-08, 412 (1872).
25. Act of Feb. 5, 1967, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385.
26. See id. § 1, 14 Stat. at 385.
27. For two slightly different views on Tarble, compare Daniel A. Farber, The Trouble With
Tarble's: An Excerpt from an Alternative Casebook, 16 CONsT. COMMENT. 517 (1999) (suggesting
that an alternative result in Tarble's Case would have had disastrous consequences), with Edward
A. Hartnett, The Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. REv. 251, 258-60 (2005)
(arguing that "one might expect that the state courts" were available to issue writs of habeas
corpus when "neither the Supreme Court nor inferior federal courts were").
28. For reasons having more to do with economy of space than principle, I do not consider in
this essay whether such a reading of the Suspension Clause should also provoke a thorough
reevaluation of the availability of federal habeas for state prisoners, and the potential
constitutional limits on Congress's authority to constrain such a remedy. For one such argument
based on an even more forceful critique of Bollman than that offered herein, see FREEDMAN, supra
note 13, at 20-42. For a summary of the larger problem, especially in light of AEDPA, see Irons
v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 665-70 (9th Cir. 2007) (Noonan, J., concurring).
20. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
30. See id. at 776.
31. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955); Bums v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137, 139 (1953) (plurality opinion).
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so-called "Insular Cases, 3 2 to argue that the Constitution in general-
and the Suspension Clause in particular-should not generally apply to
noncitizens overseas.33
But, as Part III concludes, the Court in these cases viewed the Sus-
pension Clause issue as coextensive with the merits. Thus, in Eisen-
trager, the Court held that the Suspension Clause could not be
"invoked" by enemy aliens convicted by a U.S. military tribunal in
China, concluding that such detainees had no rights whatsoever, includ-
ing no "right" to habeas corpus.34 Indeed, Eisentrager must be under-
stood for what it was-as a sweeping repudiation of Judge Prettyman's
even more sweeping opinion for the D.C. Circuit, which had suggested
that all individuals everywhere had a virtually immutable right to habeas
corpus.3 5 Such a right was ultimately meaningless if, as Justice Jackson
concluded in Eisentrager, the petitioners' claims were meritless.36
Because these cases were decided decades before the Court's mod-
em obsession with threshold jurisdictional questions,37 we might better
understand Eisentrager and its progeny as suggesting that Congress was
not required to provide for habeas corpus when there were no substan-
tive rights capable of enforcement upon the merits.38 Indeed, after dis-
pensing with the petitioners' right to the writ of habeas corpus,
Eisentrager, a case with "an awful lot of alternative holdings,"39 devoted
32. The term "Insular Cases" actually refers to several dozen decisions handed down by the
Supreme Court during the first quarter of the twentieth century involving the applicability of the
Bill of Rights to the United States' new overseas territories, including Cuba, Panama, Puerto Rico,
and the Philippines. For a wonderful and thorough modem treatment of the cases and their
background, see BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF
AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006).
33. For the most thorough contemporary version of this argument, see generally J. Andrew
Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 521-24
(2007) (arguing that, as a constitutional matter, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should
only be available within the territorial United States).
34. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777-81.
35. See Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd, 339 U.S. 763.
36. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776-85.
37. See, e.g., Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1191-92
(2007); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83 (1998); see also Vladeck, supra note
12, at 1525 n.143 (discussing Steel Co.).
38. Cf Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15 (2002) ("[T]he very point of
recognizing any access claim is to provide some effective vindication for a separate and distinct
right to seek judicial relief for some wrong. However unsettled the basis of the constitutional right
of access to courts, our cases rest on the recognition that the right is ancillary to the underlying
claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court.") (footnote
omitted); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 339 (1993) ("When there is no right to a
constitutional remedy, it would seem to follow that there can be no right to judicial review.").
39. Transcript of Oral Argument at 72, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-
184) (statement of Solicitor General Clement), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/
argument-transcripts/05-184.pdf [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument].
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another ten full pages to the question whether the petitioners had any
substantive constitutional or treaty-based rights to enforce in their
habeas petitions.4 ° Such analysis simply should not have mattered if the
petitioners were not entitled to invoke the writ in the first place. Instead,
as Part III concludes, the real violence to precedent worked by Eisen-
trager is its conflation of the merits with the availability of habeas.
Properly read, Eisentrager is not inconsistent with the idea that, so long
as habeas has not been validly suspended, the Constitution protects
access to some form of the writ for anyone with meritorious claims of
unlawful detention.
On that view, the harder questions in the current cases concern the
merits. Have the detainees in fact alleged detention in violation of the
"Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States"?4" Is the statutory
remedy provided by the MCA and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
("DTA" )42 an "adequate" and "effective" substitute for the remedy that
would be available via habeas? 43 Is the process provided by the Com-
batant Status Review Tribunals (and the D.C. Circuit, on appeal) consti-
tutionally sufficient?
44
The purpose of this essay is not to suggest answers to these incredi-
bly difficult questions. Rather, my goal is to suggest that the answer
cannot simply be, as the D.C. Circuit held in Boumediene, that the Sus-
pension Clause does not "apply."45 It may be that the MCA is ulti-
mately constitutional because it does not effect a deprivation of a
remedy that would otherwise have been available (a result I find
unlikely, but not impossible), but it just cannot be the case that the MCA
exists entirely outside the scope of the Suspension Clause.
40. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 781-90.
41. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 n.15 (2004) ("Petitioners' allegations-that,
although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States,
they have been held in executive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the long-
term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to counsel and
without being charged with any wrongdoing-unquestionably describe 'custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'") (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(2000)).
42. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (to be codified in scattered sections of
10, 28, & 42 U.S.C.).
43. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381-83 (1977) (holding that the Suspension Clause
is not implicated when habeas is unavailable unless there is no "adequate" or "effective"
substitute).
44. Cf Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir.) (considering the scope of the remedy
provided by the MCA and the DTA), as amended on denial of reh'g, 503 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
45. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 988-94 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S.
Ct. 3078 (2007).
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II. THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE: ORIGINS AND EARLY APPLICATION
The common-law origins of (and English and colonial experiences
with) the writ of habeas corpus have been extensively documented else-
where,46 and, with limited exceptions, are not the subject of significant
contemporary dispute. As one author has summarized,
The origin of the writ is obscure. Traces are found in the Year
Books as early as 48 Edward III [1374]. For several centuries the
writ was used by the King's courts as a weapon in their battle to
control the lower courts. It was probably not used against the crown
until the reign of Henry VII .... Whatever its origin, by the time of
Charles 1 (1625-1649) the writ was fully established as the appropri-
ate process for checking illegal imprisonment by public officials or
inferior courts. However, it acquired its full and present importance
by legislation.47
Thus, in a host of statutes-including the Habeas Corpus Act of
1679-Parliament codified various applications of the writ to challenge
criminal confinement, but also left intact the availability of the common-
law writ in challenges to noncriminal detention.48 The prevailing colo-
nial practice mirrored the English experience, with at least six of the
colonies formally adopting the English Habeas Corpus Act,4 9 and the
other seven recognizing the availability of the common-law writ.5 ° I am
oversimplifying vast swaths of English and colonial legal history,5" but
the upside is that, at the time of the Founding, it was well understood
throughout the colonies that noncriminal habeas was a creature primarily
of the common law, and was an important stopgap against arbitrary
executive action-something hardly unknown to revolutionary-era
America.
A. The Suspension Clause at Philadelphia and After
"[T]he history of the [Suspension] Clause at the [1787 Constitu-
46. See, e.g., Hafetz, supra note 13, at 2520-36. See generally DUKER, supra note 13, at
12-125 (surveying the British and colonial experiences with the writ).
47. Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative
Grace?, 40 CAL. L. REv. 335, 336 (1952).
48. See id. at 336-38; see also DUKER, supra note 13, at 12-94 (summarizing the evolution of
the writ in England).
49. See Collings, supra note 47, at 338-39.
50. See DUKER, supra note 13, at 115 ("[Olne finds that the common-law writ of habeas
corpus was in operation in all thirteen of the British colonies that rebelled in 1776.").
51. For a thorough and thoughtful modem recounting of this history, see Paul D. Halliday &
G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American
Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2008), available at http://ssrn.comabstract=
1008252.
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tional] Convention is sparse but clear. '5 2 On August 20, Charles Pinck-
ney of South Carolina introduced a proposal that the Constitution
provide that "[t]he privileges and benefit of the writ of habeas corpus
shall be enjoyed in this government in the most expeditious and ample
manner: and shall not be suspended by the legislature except upon the
most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding
- months."53 Without debate, Pinckney's proposal was referred to
the Committee on Detail. When it was reported back to the Convention
on August 28, the debate focused entirely on whether it was necessary to
ever allow for suspension.54 There was simply no question that the
Framers otherwise viewed habeas as inviolable.
Moreover, as Professor Paschal has argued, by the time the Framers
settled on what would become the Suspension Clause, they had already
decided to leave to Congress the power to decide whether to create
lower federal courts.5 Thus, "the Convention dealt with the possibility
of no lower federal courts by directly commanding the courts, federal
and state alike, to make the privilege of the writ routinely available."56
The scope of the Suspension Clause was not an important part of
the ratification debates that followed.57 Rather, the Anti-Federalists
used the Clause as support for their call for a Bill of Rights, suggesting
that similar protections should have been given to the other rights con-
ferred by the Constitution.58 At the heart of these arguments was the
assertion that the Clause undermined the Federalists' defense of the
Constitution as limiting the federal government's powers to those for
which the text expressly provided. If the Clause specified that the "priv-
ilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended" except in
certain cases, the negative implication, according to the Anti-Federalists,
was that habeas could have been suspended by the federal government
absent the Suspension Clause.59
Critically, the Federalists' response was that the Clause delineated
the only circumstances where the federal government could act to pre-
clude habeas-"cases of Rebellion or Invasion [when] the public Safety
52. FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 12.
53. Id. (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 13, at
334, 340-42).
54. See generally Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605,
608-17 (summarizing the debates).
55. See id. at 615.
56. Id. at 616.
57. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 16.
58. See, e.g., id. at 15-16.
59. DUKER, supra note 13, at 128 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 13, at 438).
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may require it."'60  As Professor Freedman argues, the Federalists
appeared to carry the day on this point, given the absence of virtually
any discussion of habeas in the subsequent debates over-and enact-
ment of-the Bill of Rights. 6 ' For present purposes, that this was the
crux of the debate is immensely significant; the Anti-Federalists' con-
cerns over the Suspension Clause were assuaged by the assertion that the
Clause delineated the only circumstances where habeas could be
abridged by the federal government.62 Habeas, it was presumed, would
otherwise be available to all prisoners in some forum. Had there been
any serious concern that there would be cases where the federal govern-
ment could preclude access to habeas corpus without satisfying the Sus-
pension Clause, the Anti-Federalists surely would have voiced them.
B. The Bollman Problem
As the conventional wisdom goes, Chief Justice Marshall's legen-
dary opinion in Marbury v. Madison63 created something of a predica-
ment for the Supreme Court when it came to habeas corpus.64 Marbury,
of course, denied to Congress the power to enlarge the Supreme Court's
constitutional original jurisdiction past the rigid confines of Article HI,
Section 2.65 In invalidating section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,66
however dubiously, 67 Marbury thus called into question similar lan-
guage in section 14, which appeared to empower the Supreme Court to
issue "original" writs of habeas corpus.68 Although the exercise of that
power in cases involving ambassadors would arguably fall within the
60. Id.
61. See FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 17-18. As Freedman notes, there was one minor
exception-a proposal by New York for an amendment interposing more express temporal limits
on the federal government's power to suspend habeas. See id. at 159 n.22.
62. See id. at 18 ("A fair conclusion is that the ratification debates had convinced all parties
that the Clause as written would meet the aims they agreed that they shared: to safeguard a critical
mechanism for protecting the liberties of those who might fall afoul of the organs of power.").
63. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
64. See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 27, at 256-58.
65. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-77.
66. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81.
67. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 443 (1989) (summarizing the various shortcomings of
Marshall's analysis of section 13).
68. The original version of section 14 (the modem ancestor of which appears at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a) (2000)) provided:
That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall have power to issue
writs of scirefacias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by
statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and
agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the
supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant
writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14, 1 Stat. at 81-82.
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scope of the textual grant of original jurisdiction,69 all other cases would
not, raising the question whether section 14 suffered from the same con-
stitutional defect as section 13. Just four years after Marbury, the Court
was confronted with that very issue.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the background to Ex parte
Bollman7 ° is that it isn't more well-known. When President Thomas
Jefferson ran for reelection in 1804, he opted to replace incumbent Vice
President Aaron Burr given both the disrepute into which Burr had
fallen as a result of his duel with Alexander Hamilton and the declining
relationship between the two men.71 The enigmatic Burr, facing charges
in both New York and New Jersey arising out of the Hamilton duel,
traveled to the West, where he allegedly attempted to lead various U.S.
territories in an uprising against the federal government.72
In December 1806, General James Wilkinson, the U.S. military
commander in New Orleans (who was himself allegedly part of the plot)
arrested two of Burr's "co-conspirators," Samuel Swartwout and Dr.
Erick Bollman. 3 Ignoring writs of habeas corpus issued by federal
judges in New Orleans and Charleston, South Carolina,74 Wilkinson
transported the two men to Washington, where a divided D.C. Circuit
Court issued an arrest warrant on charges of treason.7 5 Both filed peti-
tions for writs of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court, while, at the
same time, Congress considered (and the Senate approved) a measure
that would have suspended the writ in the pending cases.76
The first question before the Court in Bollman was whether the
Court had the authority to entertain such habeas petitions (even though it
had done so without comment on two prior occasions).77 Writing for a
69. See, e.g., Exparte Hung Hang, 108 U.S. 552, 553 (1883). See generally Dallin H. Oaks,
The "Original" Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 153.
70. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
71. See generally NANCY ISENBERO, FALLEN FOUNDER: THE LIFE OF AARON BURR 223-79
(2007) (summarizing Burr's tempestuous vice-presidency).
72. For a more even-handed treatment of Burr that views some of the allegations with great
skepticism, see id. at 271-316. For a recent account more suspicious of Burr, see BUCKNER F.
MELTON, JR., AARON BURR: CONSPIRACY TO TREASON (2002).
73. See FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 20-21 & 161 nn.3-4.
74. See, e.g., DUKER, supra note 13, at 135.
75. See United States v. Bollman, 24 F. Cas. 1189, 1192 (C.C.D.D.C. 1807) (No. 14,622). For
a general discussion of the atmospherics of the case, see JEFFREY BRANDON MORRIS, CALMLY To
POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRcUrr 15-17 (2001).
76. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 79 (1807). For the background of the
proposed suspension, see DUKER, supra note 13, at 135-37. See also Paschal, supra note 54, at
623-24.
77. See Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 449 (1806); United States v. Hamilton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795).
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3-1 majority,78 Chief Justice Marshall began by disclaiming the notion
that the federal courts could exercise any jurisdiction not conferred by
the Constitution or by statute. 79 As courts of limited subject-matter
jurisdiction, the federal courts were not common-law courts, and could
only be empowered by positive law. Thus, "for the meaning of the term
habeas corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the common law;
but the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States,
must be given by written law."8 ° Marshall thus disavowed the power of
the Supreme Court-or any federal court, for that matter-to issue com-
mon-law writs of habeas corpus, even though his subsequent analysis
rendered such a conclusion irrelevant.
Marshall turned next to the question whether any statute conferred
upon the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of habeas corpus.81
Although section 14 of the Judiciary Act referred to the power of the
Justices of the Supreme Court, and not the Court itself, Marshall read the
statute as giving the Court the power to issue the writ en banc:
It may be worthy of remark, that this act was passed by the first
congress of the United States, sitting under a constitution which had
declared 'that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should not be
suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety might require it.'
Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction, they
must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing effi-
cient means by which this great constitutional privilege should
receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the priv-
ilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should
be enacted. Under the impression of this obligation, they give, to all
the courts, the power of awarding writs of habeas corpus.
82
Thus, in explaining why Congress must have empowered the
Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus, Marshall suggested,
however inadvertently, that, absent section 14, there would have been no
such thing as federal habeas corpus. Marshall may well have thought
that the First Congress, once it decided to create the lower federal courts
in the first place, was required to bestow upon those courts some modi-
cum of habeas jurisdiction, but he nowhere suggested that absent such
legislative action, the writ could nevertheless be issued by a federal
court. Put another way, Marshall's dicta rejected the notion that the Sus-
78. Justices Cushing and Chase were both absent for health-related reasons. See Bollman, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) at 93 n.4.
79. See id. at 77-80.
80. Id. at 93-94.
81. See id. at 94.
82. Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
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pension Clause contemplated a self-executing federal jurisdiction over
common-law habeas petitions. His opinion thereby intimated that the
Suspension Clause would only protect whatever statutory writ Congress
saw fit to provide.83
Finally, Marshall reached the central question: the constitutionality
of section 14. Distinguishing Marbury, the majority concluded that "so
far as that case has distinguished between original and appellate jurisdic-
tion, that which the court is now asked to exercise is clearly appellate. It
is the revision of a decision of an inferior court, by which a citizen has
been committed to jail."8 4 Of course, that logic only held in cases, such
as Bollman itself, where habeas was sought by a prisoner who had
already been the subject of other judicial proceedings. Marshall's
logic-that the Supreme Court could issue an "original" writ of habeas
corpus as an exercise of its constitutional "appellate" jurisdiction"
8 5-
left open the question of the Supreme Court's power to issue such origi-
nal writs when there was no lower-court judgment to review.86
C. Federal Habeas in State Court: To Ableman and Tarble
If the Supreme Court did not possess the constitutional authority to
issue writs of habeas corpus as part of its constitutional "original" juris-
diction, which Marbury suggested (and Bollman appeared to reaffirm),
and if the crux of the so-called "Madisonian Compromise" was that
Congress needn't have created the lower federal courts in the first place,
then contemporary observers might wonder where, exactly, the Framers
thought federal prisoners could seek habeas relief?87 The answer,
83. To understand the implications of this logic, consider Justice Scalia's dissent in INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326-47 (2001). Relying on Bollman, Justice Scalia argued that the Suspension
Clause precludes temporary suspensions of habeas corpus except in cases contemplated by the
Clause, but in no way bars a complete divestiture of habeas jurisdiction. See id. at 340 n.5 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("If, as the Court concedes, 'the writ could not be suspended,' within the meaning
of the Suspension Clause until Congress affirmatively provided for habeas by statute, then surely
Congress may subsequently alter what it had initially provided for, lest the Clause become a one-
way ratchet.") (citations omitted).
84. Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 100-01.
85. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 n.l (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) ("Such a
petition is commonly understood to be 'original' in the sense of being filed in the first instance in
this Court, but nonetheless for constitutional purposes an exercise of this Court's appellate (rather
than original) jurisdiction.").
86. Although the Court may have resolved this question in Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S.
197, 198 (1948) (per curiam), Hirota was-deliberately-unclear whether it was actually
reaching this issue. See Vladeck, supra note 12, at 1518-22 & n.107.
87. See, e.g., Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 39, 102 n.178. See generally Hartnett, supra note 27
(summarizing the "puzzle" that arises from reading Marbury and Tarble together with the
Madisonian Compromise and the Suspension Clause).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
entirely obvious to the Framers and yet forcefully repudiated by later
case law, was in the state courts.
There is no real debate whether or to what extent common-law
habeas for federal prisoners was available in antebellum state courts.
88
Well into the 1840s and early 1850s, state courts routinely inquired into
the legality of federal detention via habeas corpus, whether in the con-
text of challenges to military enlistment or to other forms of civil deten-
tion. 89  The problem that arose was in the context of the extremely
controversial Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,90 where common-law habeas
for federal prisoners provided abolitionist (or at least sympathetic)
northern state courts with a vehicle for frustrating enforcement of (or
even invalidating) the Act. 91 Thus, in In re Booth, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court ordered the release of Sherman Booth, who had been
convicted by a federal court for violating the Fugitive Slave Act by "aid-
ing and abetting[, and] assisting" the escape of a runaway slave. 92 The
court held that Booth's federal conviction was invalid on the ground that
the Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional. 93
After the court refused to respond to a writ of error issued by Chief
Justice Taney,94 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed the state
court's conclusion, denying to the Wisconsin Supreme Court the power
to pass upon the legality of Booth's federal conviction.95 Although
Taney used sweeping language that seemed to deny to state courts the
88. See, e.g., Charles Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345,
353 (1930); cf Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243
(1965) (surveying the nature and scope of habeas review in the antebellum state courts). As Oaks
writes, "[i]n the five decades preceding 1865 there are numerous instances where state courts
issued their writ of habeas corpus to release persons from the restraints imposed on their liberty by
the alleged wrongful conduct of federal officers." Id. at 288. For more on this period, including a
discussion of numerous illustrative cases, see Pettys, supra note 22, at 270-81.
89. In an 1853 opinion, Attorney General Caleb Cushing discussed (and cited) several
examples of such cases. See 6 Op. Ar'y GEN. 103, 105-07 (1853); see also DUKER, supra note
13, at 178 n.192 (citing additional cases).
90. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864).
91. For a simply wonderful (and thought-provoking) discussion of the myriad legal, ethical,
and moral issues that judges faced in enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act (along with its grandfather,
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793), see ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 175-91 (1975).
92. See In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 9 (1854) (quoting Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 9 Stat. at 464).
For more on the background to Booth, see Pettys, supra note 22, at 281-88.
93. See Booth, 3 Wis. at 17. Booth actually came before the Wisconsin Supreme Court
twice--once pre-conviction and once post-conviction. On both occasions, the court ordered his
discharge. See RIcilARD H. FALLON, JR. ET A., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 434 n.* (5th ed. 2003); see also Pettys, supra note 22, at 281-83
(summarizing the procedural posture).
94. See United States v. Booth, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 477, 478 (1856); Ableman v. Booth, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 479, 479 (1856).
95. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1859).
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power to ever entertain common-law habeas petitions by federal prison-
ers,96 the decision was subsequently read by many courts and commen-
tators as being limited to the facts-i.e., as barring federal habeas in
state court only to review a federal conviction, and not precluding state
court consideration of habeas petitions by federal prisoners held without
any judicial process. 97
It would not be until after the Civil War that the U.S. Supreme
Court would decisively reject all federal habeas in state court once and
for all. Distinguishing Booth on the ground that the Supreme Court's
decision was a sui generis result compelled entirely by the slavery
issue,98 the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered the release of Edward
Tarble, a minor who had enlisted in the federal army without his father's
consent, holding that such an enlistment was prohibited by federal law.99
Relying on (and incorporating) Chief Justice Taney's opinion in
Booth, 10 Justice Field reversed:
There are within the territorial limits of each State two governments,
restricted in their spheres of action, but independent of each other,
and supreme within their respective spheres....
Such being the distinct and independent character of the two
governments, within their respective spheres of action, it follows that
neither can intrude with its judicial process into the domain of the
other, except so far as such intrusion may be necessary on the part of
the National government to preserve its rightful supremacy in cases
of conflict of authority. In their laws, and mode of enforcement,
neither is responsible to the other. How their respective laws shall be
enacted; how they shall be carried into execution; and in what tribu-
96. See id. at 523 ("[Alfter the return is made, and the State judge or court judicially apprized
that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can proceed no
further.... He is then within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. If he
has committed an offence against their laws, their tribunals alone can punish him. If he is
wrongfully imprisoned, their judicial tribunals can release him and afford him redress."); see also
id. at 524 ("No State judge or court, after they are judicially informed that the party is imprisoned
under the authority of the United States, has any right to interfere with him, or to require him to be
brought before them .... No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful
authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an
attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence.").
97. See, e.g., DUKER, supra note 13, at 179 n.221 (citing cases); Warren, supra note 88, at
357; see also Pettys, supra note 22, at 284-88 (noting reactions to Ableman in both the state and
federal courts, and within the federal government).
98. See In re Tarble, 25 Wis. 390, 394-95, 407 (1870). As Pettys notes, other courts and
jurists agreed that Ableman could not be regarded as viable precedent because of the extent to
which it was tainted by the slavery issue. See Pettys, supra note 22, at 289 n. 142 (citing Ex parte
Holman, 28 Iowa 88 (1869) (Beck, J., dissenting)); see also COVER, supra note 91, at 187 n.*.
99. Tarble, 25 Wis. at 412-13. For more on the background, see Pettys, supra note 22, at
288-94.
100. See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 412 (1872).
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nals, or by what officers; and how much discretion, or whether any at
all shall be vested in their officers, are matters subject to their own
control, and in the regulation of which neither can interfere with the
other.'o
Chief Justice Chase dissented, arguing that the defect in the Wis-
consin Supreme Court's decision was not its authority to issue the writ,
but its analysis of the merits.10 2 Thus,
[t]o deny the right of State courts to issue the writ ... is to deny the
right to protect the citizen by habeas corpus against arbitrary impris-
onment in a large class of cases; and, I am thoroughly persuaded, was
never within the contemplation of the Convention which framed, or
the people who adopted, the Constitution.
10 3
Chief Justice Chase's vehemence notwithstanding, Tarble finally-if
controversially-settled the question. As Pettys concludes, "the debate
about the scope of state courts' power to come to the aid of federal
prisoners was over. Quickly falling into line, the state courts conceded
that they could no longer order persons released from federal custody,
no matter what the circumstances."
' 10 4
Contemporary commentators have tended to view the decision as a
dangerously myopic misstep by the Court, sacrificing constitutional doc-
trine in the name of political expediency." 5 But whatever view one
takes of the soundness of Tarble on either the stated or alternative
grounds, 106 the decision was also written against the background of a
much more expansive federal jurisdiction over habeas corpus (and, con-
sequently, a much broader "statutory" federal writ), a point that has been
101. Id. at 406, 408.
102. Id. at 412 (Chase, C.J., dissenting) ("The State court may err; and if it does, the error may
be corrected here. The mode has been prescribed and should be followed.").
103. Id. at 412-13.
104. Pettys, supra note 22, at 293 (citing Copenhaver v. Stewart, 24 S.W. 161, 163 (Mo. 1893)
("[I]t must be taken as now well-established law that state courts and the judges thereof have no
jurisdiction or power to discharge persons who are held in custody by authority of the federal
courts . . . or by officers of the United States acting under the laws thereof ....")).
105. See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 27, at 258-60, and sources cited therein; see also Daniel J.
Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2566-67 & n.158
(1998); Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33
COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 555, 596 (2002). Indeed, it is not hard to imagine how un-
reconstructed state courts in the South could have used the federal Constitution to free anti-Union
insurgents in the custody of the federal military.
106. For example, the authors of the leading federal courts casebook suggest that Tarble might
alternatively be viewed as resting on the conclusion that the federal habeas statute impliedly
excludes state court jurisdiction, along the lines later outlined by the Court in Tafflin v. Leavitt,
493 U.S. 455 (1990). See FALLoN, JR. ET AL., supra note 93, at 439. Thus, any repeal of federal
habeas jurisdiction would theoretically restore the authority of state courts to entertain those suits
precluded from federal court consideration. For more on this argument, and suggestions for why
it is unconvincing, see Pettys, supra note 22, at 294-308.
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largely overlooked by most subsequent discussions of the decision.
Thus, it is simply impossible to know whether the Court would have
shown such hostility to state courts if, at the same time, habeas was not
broadly available to federal prisoners in the federal courts.
D. After Ableman and Tarble: The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867
To briefly recap: In cutting off federal habeas in the state courts,
Ableman and Tarble both evoked the specter of a serious constitutional
problem when read together with Chief Justice Marshall's dicta in Boll-
man. After Tarble, any federal habeas petition would have to go to the
federal courts. Except where there was already a lower-court judgment
to review, Marbury precluded potential petitioners from going straight to
the Supreme Court. And yet, if Marshall was correct in Bollman, the
lower federal courts only had that habeas jurisdiction conferred upon
them by Congress. What about cases where the lower federal courts
lacked jurisdiction over a habeas petition alleging unlawful detention?
Critically, by the time Tarble was decided, that question had become
largely superfluous, thanks to the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.1°7
Motivated largely by a desire to provide federal court access to
state prisoners, particularly to enforce the provisions of the landmark
Civil Rights Act of 1866108 and the soon-to-be-ratified Fourteenth
Amendment,10 9 the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act purported to extend the
jurisdiction of the federal courts over habeas "to their constitutional
limit."' 110 Thus, the Act made clear that federal courts-and the individ-
ual judges thereof-would have the authority "within their respective
jurisdictions" to "grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitu-
tion, or of any treaty or law of the United States." ' Although the sig-
nal achievement of the 1867 Act was in its general extension of federal
habeas corpus to state prisoners, the Act also expanded federal habeas
jurisdiction for federal prisoners to extend to virtually any claim of
unlawful federal detention. In so providing, the Act effectively mooted
the Bollman/Tarble question, for it was hard, at least at the time, to
imagine a case of allegedly unlawful federal detention over which the
federal courts would not have had jurisdiction under the terms of the
1867 Act. 12 The question whether the Suspension Clause protected a
107. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
108. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
109. See Evan Tsen Lee, The Theories of Federal Habeas Corpus, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 151,
189-91 (1994).
110. DUKER, supra note 13, at 191.
111. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. at 385.
112. The famous case of Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868), arose out of an
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common-law writ of habeas corpus in cases where there was no statu-
tory writ was simply irrelevant in the context of a statutory writ that
truly extended "to the constitutional limit."
With respect to federal prisoners, then, the only question the 1867
Act left unanswered was the meaning of the phrase "within their respec-
tive jurisdictions."" 3 Were there, in fact, cases of federal detention
where no federal court could issue the writ "within [its] respective juris-
diction[ ]"? With one exception, 1 4 the answer to that question rested in
obscurity through the Second World War.
III. THE AHRENS PROBLEM: STATUTORY JURISDICTION FOR
EXTRATERRITORIAL HABEAS
A. Extraterritorial Habeas After World War II
At the end of the Second World War, the Supreme Court faced a
largely unprecedented problem: the availability of habeas corpus to the
thousands of individuals in U.S. custody overseas. 1 5 For obvious rea-
attempt by Congress to repeal part of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under the 1867
Act. See id. at 509. McCardle, however, did not have to reach the constitutional issue, since the
Act repealing the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction did not also repeal its "original"
jurisdiction under section 14. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 96 (1869) (sustaining
jurisdiction under section 14). See generally Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659-62 (1996)
(summarizing the relationship between McCardle and Yerger).
113. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. at 385.
114. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901), one of the so-called "Insular Cases," is often cited
for the proposition that the Suspension Clause did not apply to the "territories," including Cuba.
But Neely is entirely unhelpful (to either side). All that the elder Justice Harlan wrote for the
Court in Neely was that the Suspension Clause and various other constitutional protections "have
no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a
foreign country." Id. at 122. In other words, Neely could not challenge his extradition for a
Cuban conviction (that predated U.S. control) on the ground that the conviction violated his
constitutional rights. A significant decision with respect to the law of extradition, it has little-if
any-bearing on the Suspension Clause issues implicated herein.
Indeed, only one reported decision prior to the Second World War appeared to expressly
reject the availability of habeas to an individual detained overseas. See McGowan v. Moody, 22
App. D.C. 148 (D.C. Cir. 1903). But in refusing to issue the writ in the case of a U.S. citizen
detained in Guam, the D.C. Circuit also relied on the argument that the Secretary of the Navy was
the improper respondent, suggesting that it might have issued the writ absent the procedural
defect. Cf. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 436 (2004) (holding that the Secretary of Defense
was the improper respondent to a habeas petition filed by a U.S. citizen detained at a South
Carolina Navy brig).
115. According to one contemporaneous commentator, the practice of returning U.S. citizens
sentenced to lengthy prison terms abroad to the United States to serve their sentence may have
helped explain the dearth of relevant case law. See Note, Habeas Corpus Protection Against
Illegal Extraterritorial Detention, 51 COLUM. L. Rnv. 368, 368 n.3 (1951). Slightly more
sarcastically, another writer suggested that "the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over aliens by
American institutions abroad applying American law is indeed a rather peculiar phenomenon of
the post-World War II period." Douglas E. Dayton, Comment, A Critique of the Eisentrager
Case: American Law Abroad-Habeas Corpus at Home?, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 303, 330 (1951).
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sons, the absence of relevant case law put the Court in a difficult posi-
tion, as it was faced with dozens-if not hundreds-of petitions from
detained enemy (and friendly) prisoners by the early spring of 1946.116
And although the Court was evenly divided on the question of its
authority to entertain original habeas petitions,117 it saw no defect what-
soever in exercising its constitutional appellate jurisdiction in 1946 to
review the conviction by military commission of Japanese General
Tomoyuki Yamashita, even though Yamashita was a noncitizen detained
outside the continental United States." 8 The Court ultimately (and con-
troversially) affirmed Yamashita's conviction on the merits,11 9 but the
overlooked significance of Yamashita is that the Court reached the mer-
its at all, rather than holding that Yamashita had no right to judicial
review. 120
Later in 1946, in Ex parte Betz, the Court denied a motion for leave
to file an original habeas petition brought by seven U.S. citizens
detained overseas. 121 Justices Black and Rutledge, however, noted that
they would deny the petitions without prejudice to refiling in the appro-
priate district court, suggesting that the defect ran only to the Court's
original jurisdiction, and not to the availability of the writ as a general
matter. '
22
What is perhaps most telling about Yamashita and Betz is that the
question of the potential extraterritorial availability of habeas corpus did
not seem to bother the Court in either instance. In Yamashita, the Court
affirmed the military commission's conviction, rendering habeas unnec-
essary. In Betz, the Court concluded that it lacked original jurisdiction
to hear the petitions, but nevertheless suggested that the lower courts
might not. In neither case did the Court suggest that habeas might as a
general matter be unavailable, either because the petitioner was a nonci-
tizen or because the petitioner was being held overseas (or, as in
Yamashita, both).
116. For summaries of these cases, and of the complicated jurisdictional issues they presented,
see Vladeck, supra note 12, at 1506-11. The definitive accounting remains Charles Fairman,
Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REV. 587 (1949).
117. See, e.g., Everett ex rel. Bersin v. Truman, 334 U.S. 824 (1948) (mem.). Only eight
Justices participated in these cases, since Justice Jackson recused by virtue of his role as Chief
Prosecutor at the Nuremberg tribunal. As a result, it was unclear at the time-and remains unclear
today-whether it was the absence of a fifth vote, or the even division of the Justices, that
precluded review. For more on the Court's "original" habeas jurisdiction, see Oaks, supra note
69.
118. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 4, 26 (1946).
119. Id. at 25-26.
120. Id.
121. 329 U.S. 672, 672 (1946) (mem.).
122. See id.
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B. The Mess Ahrens Made
Then, at the end of the 1947 Term, came Ahrens v. Clark and its
crabbed reading of the "within their respective jurisdictions" language in
the federal habeas statute to authorize jurisdiction over habeas petitions
only in the district of confinement. 23 That is, Ahrens suggested that all
federal habeas petitions had to be brought where the detainee was con-
fined, rather than in an appropriate court with jurisdiction over the
respondent.1 24  Although Ahrens expressly reserved the question
whether its holding applied in cases where the petitioner was not held in
the territorial jurisdiction of any district court,1 25 its logic appeared,
however unintentionally, to divest the federal courts of statutory juris-
diction in those cases as well. 126 Ahrens thus forced the issue that the
Supreme Court had otherwise been able to avoid since Ableman and
Tarble: If the habeas statute did not itself authorize jurisdiction over
petitions filed by detainees held outside the jurisdiction of any district
court (as the district court in Eisentrager would soon hold127), then the
question whether the statute so construed would violate the Suspension
Clause was thrust to the forefront.
That fact was lost on the Court in its first meaningful post-Ahrens
consideration of the extraterritorial availability of habeas petitions. I
have written elsewhere in (nauseating) detail"2 8 about the Court's
December 1948 decision in Hirota v. MacArthur,1 29 but one point about
Hirota bears emphasizing here: In cursorily denying an original habeas
petition by noncitizens convicted by the Tokyo war crimes tribunal (and
detained by the U.S. Army in Japan), the Court did not suggest that, as a
general matter, the writ was unavailable to noncitizens overseas. On the
contrary, although the Court was unclear as to the specific ground for its
jurisdictional holding, 3 ° it was clear that its decision, however con-
strued, rested upon the specific facts of the case, and not the general
unavailability of the writ.13 1 Hirota, in other words, presented the Court
123. 335 U.S. 188, 192 (1948), overruled by Braden v. Thirtieth Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410
U.S. 484 (1973).
124. See id.
125. See id. at 192 n.4.
126. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 12, at 1512-13 & nn.80-81.
127. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, unpublished opinion (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 1948), reprinted in
Transcript of Record at 16-17, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (No. 306), rev'd, 174
F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd, 339 U.S. 763.
128. See generally Vladeck, supra note 12.
129. 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per curiam).
130. See Vladeck, supra note 12, at 1518 & n.107.
131. See, e.g., Hirota, 338 U.S. at 198 ("We are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing these
petitioners is not a tribunal of the United States .... Under the foregoing circumstances the courts
of the United States have no power or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the
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with perhaps the easiest case in which to hold that the Suspension
Clause did not protect habeas for noncitizens held overseas-and the
Court refused to so conclude. Again, the Court did not suggest that
habeas was generally available, either for noncitizens or for individuals
held overseas (or both), but its refusal to take what would have been a
much easier path out of the jurisdictional morass that Hirota presented
simply cannot be ignored. 132
Finally, at least with respect to citizens, the Court indicated not
long after Hirota (and notwithstanding Ahrens) that extraterritorial
habeas might be available despite the statutory problem, dismissing an
original habeas petition filed by a U.S. serviceman without prejudice to
refilling in "any appropriate court that may have jurisdiction." 133 In that
very case, the D.C. District Court subsequently sustained jurisdiction,




Of course, the implicit holdings and silent implications of the pre-
1950 cases pale in comparison to some-if not much-of the language
employed by the Supreme Court in Eisentrager, which rejected the
availability of habeas to twenty-two German nationals seeking review of
their convictions by a U.S. military commission convened in China. 135
Lothar Eisentrager was one of a group of twenty-two German
nationals stationed in China during the Second World War who, after
Germany surrendered, continued to participate in intelligence operations
on behalf of the Japanese military.' 36 After the war, the group was taken
into custody and tried by a U.S. military commission on charges that
they had violated the laws of war by continuing their belligerency after
the German surrender. 13  They were convicted and repatriated to Ger-
many to serve their sentences at Landsberg Prison, at which point they
brought habeas petitions in the D.C. District Court.13' Basing its deci-
judgments and sentences imposed on these petitioners and for this reason the motions for leave to
file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.").
132. Nor is there any argument that the Court was trying to avoid the Suspension Clause
question, for its narrower, murkier jurisdictional holding was also based upon its resolution of a
constitutional question-either the scope of its constitutional appellate jurisdiction, or the scope of
all federal question jurisdiction, under Article IlI.
133. In re Bush, 336 U.S. 971, 971 (1949) (mem.).
134. See In re Bush, 84 F. Supp. 873, 875 (D.D.C. 1949).
135. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765, 776-78 (1950).
136. See id. at 765-66.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 766-67. For a comprehensive discussion of the factual and historical
background, see Dayton, supra note 115.
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sion entirely on Ahrens, the District Court dismissed the petitions for
want of territorial jurisdiction.' 39 The D.C. Circuit reversed.14
Writing for the appeals court, Judge E. Barrett Prettyman argued
that it would be unconstitutional to read the federal habeas statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2241, to preclude any federal court from issuing a writ of
habeas corpus to aliens detained abroad:
The question here is not whether a court, either state or federal,
can exercise its judicial power within the jurisdiction of another and
independent government. The question is whether it can exercise that
power upon those Government officials within its territorial jurisdic-
tion who have directive power over the immediate jailer outside the
United States but acting solely upon authority of this Government.
We think that it can, if that be the only means of applying the Consti-
tution to a given governmental action.' 41
On appeal, faced squarely with a constitutional question that could
easily have been avoided,' 42 the Supreme Court reversed for two differ-
ent-but related-reasons. First, invoking the Alien Enemy Act 143 as
an analogy, Justice Jackson wrote that "the nonresident enemy alien,
especially one who has remained in the service of the enemy, does not
have.., access to our courts, for he neither has comparable claims upon
our institutions nor could his use of them fail to be helpful to the
enemy."''44 Jackson continued:
We have pointed out that the privilege of litigation has been
extended to aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permit-
ting their presence in the country implied protection. No such basis
can be invoked here, for these prisoners at no relevant time were
within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and
the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punish-
ment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the
139. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, unpublished opinion (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 1948), reprinted in
Transcript of Record at 16-17, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (No. 306), rev'd, 174
F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd, 339 U.S. 763.
140. See Eisentrager, 174 F.2d at 968.
141. Id. at 967 (footnotes omitted).
142. The constitutional question could easily have been avoided if the D.C. Circuit had been
more careful. The district court had found that Ahrens controlled, when it clearly didn't, and no
earlier Supreme Court precedent filled the gap. Thus, the D.C. Circuit could simply have held
that, where habeas petitions were filed by petitioners detained outside the United States, a sensible
reading of the federal habeas statute permitted jurisdiction in the district court. Just two months
later, Justice Douglas would suggest precisely as much in his post-hoc concurrence in Hirota. See
Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 202-03 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring).
143. 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (2000). For a more detailed discussion of the Act and its application
and interpretation during the Second World War, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Enemy Aliens, Enemy
Property, and Access to the Courts, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 963, 967-77 (2007).
144. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765, 776.
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United States.
145
Notwithstanding these broad statements about the unavailability of
habeas to enemy aliens detained overseas, the majority then proceeded
to reach the merits of the petitioners' claims, devoting ten full pages to
whether the petitioners could invoke the Fifth Amendment or the 1929
Geneva Convention as grounds for holding their trials unlawful.' 46 Dis-
missing the Geneva Convention argument in a footnote, 147 the Court
devoted careful attention to the question whether the Due Process Clause
protected the petitioners, and ultimately concluded that it did not.' 48 As
such, the Court's analysis suggested that the petitions were ultimately
meritless, whether there was jurisdiction to entertain them or not.
Indeed, "[t]he opinion is unclear about which of [the] two rationales
justified its holding that no habeas review was permissible . . . .The
Court mentioned both factors and did not get into the tricky business of
which was doing the work."' 4 9
Further support for the notion that the merits were central to the
Eisentrager Court's resolution of the jurisdictional question might be
derived from the final paragraph of Jackson's discussion of the availabil-
ity of habeas:
[T]he doors of our courts have not been summarily closed upon these
prisoners. Three courts have considered their application and have
provided their counsel opportunity to advance every argument in
their support and to show some reason in the petition why they
should not be subject to the usual disabilities of non-resident enemy
aliens. This is the same preliminary hearing as to sufficiency of appli-
cation that was extended in Quirin, Yamashita, and Hirota v. MacAr-
thur. After hearing all contentions they have seen fit to advance and
considering every contention we can base on their application and the
holdings below, we arrive at the same conclusion the Court reached
in each of those cases, viz.: that no right to the writ of habeas corpus
appears. 
15O
Quirin and Yamashita, however, affirmed the denial of habeas peti-
tions on the merits, and Hirota denied an "original" habeas petition on a
ground other than that the writ was generally unavailable to noncitizens
145. Id. at 777-78.
146. See id. at 781-90.
147. See id. at 789 & n.14.
148. See id. at 781-85.
149. Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1306 n.174 (2002); see also Dayton, supra note 115, at 322
(noting that the decision was "difficult indeed to disentangle"); Developments in the Law-
Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1163 n.55 (1970) ("[Ilt is not clear whether
reversal was on the basis of the Ahrens rule or on the merits of the claim.").
150. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 780-81 (citations omitted).
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overseas. 5 ' Thus, whereas the majority in Eisentrager clearly rejected
the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the Suspension Clause, it appears that
such a result rested at least largely on the absence of merit to the peti-
tioners' claims, as opposed to a more general unavailability of habeas to
noncitizens held overseas. Quite simply, if the writ protected by the
Suspension Clause could not reach noncitizens outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States then the merits should not have
mattered.
The far more tenable reading of Eisentrager is as holding that,
because the petitioners' claims lacked merit, the district court's interpre-
tation of the habeas statute as precluding jurisdiction did not raise any
Suspension Clause concerns. 15 2 Habeas should have been available, but
only for the courts to do what the Supreme Court eventually did-deny
the Eisentrager petitioners' claims on the merits.
D. After Eisentrager: U.S. Citizens and the Suspension Clause
Whereas Eisentrager held that habeas was not available to enemy
aliens detained overseas-arguably because they had no rights capable
of enforcement upon the merits-the Supreme Court would soon clarify
that habeas was available for U.S. citizens detained overseas. Indeed, in
those cases, the central question was not whether the detainees had
rights, but whether those rights had been violated.
Thus, in Burns v. Wilson, 53 the Court affirmed the denial of a
habeas petition filed by servicemen who were convicted of murder and
rape, respectively, by courts-martial convened in Guam.'5 4 Writing for
a plurality, Chief Justice Vinson held that the federal courts could only
inquire into whether the courts-martial properly had jurisdiction over the
cases, and could not review the judgments themselves. 5 5 That the
courts could inquire into anything-i.e., that, after Ahrens, they had
jurisdiction over petitions filed by U.S. citizens detained overseas-was
itself significant. And yet, the plurality almost brushed over the point:
In this case, we are dealing with habeas corpus applicants who
assert-rightly or wrongly-that they have been imprisoned and sen-
tenced to death as a result of proceedings which denied them basic
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The federal civil courts have
jurisdiction over such applications. By statute, Congress has charged
them with the exercise of that power. Accordingly, our initial concern
151. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text (discussing Hirota).
152. See generally Vladeck, supra note 12, at 1529-30 (further elaborating upon this view of
Eisentrager).
153. 346 U.S. 137 (1953) (plurality opinion).
154. See id. at 138, 146.
155. See id. at 142-46.
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is not whether the District Court has any power at all to consider
petitioners' applications; rather our concern is with the manner in
which the Court should proceed to exercise its power.' 56
Burns thus suggested that, even though the petitioners were detained
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any district court, they were still
entitled to habeas review of the merits of their claims, ostensibly
because their claims might have merit.
After filing an opinion neither concurring in nor dissenting from the
judgment in Burns,'57 Justice Frankfurter subsequently filed a more
thorough statement (in the context of the Court's denial of rehearing)
criticizing the plurality on a host of grounds, including its summary
treatment of the jurisdictional issue.'58 In his words:
Both petitioners, alleging confinement in Japan and American
citizenship, sought habeas corpus in the District of Columbia.
Thus there is raised squarely the question, thus far reserved by
us, whether an American citizen detained by federal officers outside
of any federal judicial district, may maintain habeas corpus directed
against the official superior of the officers actually having him in
custody.
Petitioners have not discussed the question of jurisdiction, and
the Government appears disinclined to argue it.
We should not permit a question of jurisdiction as far-reaching
as this one to go by concession, or decide it sub silentio. I express no
view on how we should determine the issue, or on what grounds, but
I think that we should frankly face it, even at the risk of concluding
that a legislative remedy is necessary. It is particularly important that
we do so at this time when thousands of our citizens in uniform are
serving overseas.
1 59
Justice Frankfurter's angst notwithstanding, Burns appeared to settle the
question. Even though Eisentrager, read together with Ahrens, sug-
gested that the habeas statute did not extend to noncitizens held over-
seas, Burns came to the opposite conclusion in a case where the
petitioners were citizens.1
60
156. Id. at 139 (footnote omitted). For the proposition that "[tihe federal civil courts have
jurisdiction over such applications," Vinson cited 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and In re Yamashita, 327 U.S.
1, 8 (1946), even though Ahrens and the district court's decision in Eisentrager seemed to compel
quite the opposite conclusion.
157. See Bums, 346 U.S. at 148-50 (Frankfurter, J.).
158. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844 (1953) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
159. Id. at 851-52 (citations omitted).
160. Cf. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 497 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The constitutional
doubt that the Court of Appeals in Eisentrager had erroneously attributed to the lack of habeas for
an alien abroad might indeed exist with regard to a citizen abroad-justifying a strained
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Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court were to similar effect.
In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,'6 1 for example, the Court sus-
tained a constitutional challenge to a conviction by court-martial brought
by a U.S. citizen detained overseas, holding that the court-martial vio-
lated various of the petitioner's constitutional rights because he was no
longer a serviceman at the time of his arrest. 162 Although Justice Reed,
joined by Justices Burton and Minton, and Justice Burton, joined by
Justice Minton, both filed opinions dissenting on the merits, 1 63 neither
expressed concern with the Court's jurisdiction. Where there was a col-
orable claim on the merits, the Court again accepted, without deciding,
that Ahrens simply did not apply.
In the ensuing decades, Burns and Toth were so read-as deciding,
"sub silentio and by fiat, that at least a citizen held abroad by federal
authorities has access to the writ in the District of Columbia."'' 64 Only
in the case of a noncitizen held overseas-where Eisentrager left
unclear whether the issue was the unavailability of habeas in the abstract
or the absence of substantive claims on the merits-might there be a
common-law habeas claim falling outside the jurisdictional scope of
§ 2241.
IV. GUANTANAMO AND THE "STRUCTURAL" SUSPENSION CLAUSE
A. Rasul and Boumediene
The next time the Supreme Court would be asked to decide that
question was in 2004, in Rasul v. Bush,'65 a case arising out of the
detention of noncitizen "enemy combatants" at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba.
With the exception of a tantalizing footnote,' 66 Rasul declined to reach
the merits of the Guantdinamo detainees' claims, holding only that the
federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, does in fact confer jurisdiction
upon the district courts to reach those claims, and remanding with
instructions to the lower courts to do so. 167 On remand, two different
construction of the habeas statute, or (more honestly) a determination of constitutional right to
habeas.").
161. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
162. See id. at 17-23.
163. See id. at 23-44 (Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 44-45 (Burton, J., dissenting).
164. Ex parte Hayes, 414 U.S. 1327, 1328-29 (1973) (Douglas, Circuit Justice) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting PAUL M. BATOR ET AL, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 359 n.52 (2d ed. 1973)).
165. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
166. See supra note 41 (citing Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483 n.15).
167. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-85. As the Court held, to whatever extent Ahrens precluded
the exercise of statutory habeas jurisdiction in Eisentrager, later cases, especially Braden v.
Thirtieth Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), called that holding into doubt.
See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-85.
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district judges reached conflicting conclusions on the merits.1 68 Those
decisions notwithstanding, the litigation has since been preoccupied with
the question whether Congress can take away the statutory jurisdiction
recognized in Rasul. After an abortive attempt to do so through the
DTA, 169 which the Supreme Court held did not apply to pending cases
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 7 ° Congress responded with the MCA. 7 ' In
sweeping terms, the Act provides that:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or con-
sider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf
of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by
the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy com-
batant or is awaiting such determination. 72
Although the Act provides for an appeal of a military commission
conviction (or "enemy combatant" determination) to the D.C. Circuit,
there are serious and substantial questions as to whether that remedy is
an "adequate" or "effective" substitute for habeas corpus,"' particularly
with respect to the petitioners' claims under the Geneva Conventions.
1 74
The D.C. Circuit, however, sidestepped such questions, holding in
Boumediene that the Guantdnamo detainees, by virtue of the fact that
they are noncitizens detained outside the territorial United States, have
no constitutional rights, including the "right" to habeas corpus.1 75 Sug-
gesting that "[t]he text of the Suspension Clause also does not lend itself
freely to extraterritorial application,"' 176 the court concluded that section
168. Compare In re Guantdnamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005), with
Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
169. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (to be codified in scattered sections of
10, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).
170. See 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2762-69 (2006).
171. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28 &
42 U.S.C.).
172. Id. § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2635-36 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)).
173. Compare, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977), with Bismullah v. Gates, 501
F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (considering the scope of the remedy provided by the MCA and the
DTA). For more on the understudied question of Congress's power to fashion alternative remedies
to habeas, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Habeas Corpus, Alternative Remedies, and the Myth of Swain
v. Pressley, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
174. The detainees' Geneva claims are particularly problematic because of section 5 of the
MCA, which provides:
No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any
habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a
current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of
the United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or
its States or territories.
MCA § 5(a), 120 Stat. at 2631 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
175. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 988-92 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078
(2007).
176. Id. at 992 n. 11.
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7 constitutionally divested it of jurisdiction.177
Dissenting, Judge Rogers focused on the nature of the Suspension
Clause and the extent to which, unlike the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments, it operates as a general, structural constraint on congres-
sional action. 78 Thus, "[t]he court holds that Congress may suspend
habeas corpus as to the detainees because they have no individual rights
under the Constitution. It is unclear where the court finds that the limit
on suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is an individual entitle-
ment." 179 Instead, Judge Rogers analogized the Suspension Clause to
the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses, casting the constitu-
tional provision as a limit on the government's authority, one that has
universal application and can only be surmounted when its textual sub-
stantive prerequisites are satisfied.' 8 °
B. The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right
What should be clear by now is that the difference between the
majority and dissenting opinions in Boumediene epitomizes the distinc-
tion between the absolute view of the Suspension Clause and the quali-
fied, merits-based view thereof. Judge Rogers viewed the Clause as an
absolute and overriding limitation on Congress's power to preclude
access to the courts, one that should not vary with the circumstances.
The post-Bollman, post-Tarble, post-Eisentrager view, on the other
hand, posits that the Suspension Clause simply does not apply to non-
citizens overseas because it is only implicated where habeas is unavaila-
ble for a meritorious claim (and noncitizens, according to the
Boumediene majority, have no extraterritorial rights, and therefore no
possible merit to their legal claims). This view, too, is predicated on the
notion that the Suspension Clause is a limit-a limit on the govern-
ment's power to do away with federal jurisdiction over meritorious
habeas petitions.
The reality, however, is that neither view is entirely accurate. As
discussed above, the Suspension Clause was intended as an affirmative
grant of authority to the federal government, in the absence of which the
writ of habeas corpus, at least "as it existed in 1789," must be available
to federal prisoners somewhere. From the Framers' perspective, except
where validly suspended, habeas would be inviolable. The petitioner
may be destined to lose on the merits-indeed, the claims may even be
177. See id. at 994.
178. See id. at 995-97 & n.1 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 995.
180. Id. at 996-97 & n.3.
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frivolous-but it would be up to the courts, in the first instance, to say
SO.
Thus, although Judge Rogers incorrectly portrayed the Suspension
Clause as a limitation on the federal government's authority (rather than
as a grant of power to suspend), her opinion had at its core a premise far
more analogous to that of the Framers, i.e., that the availability of habeas
does not vary based upon the circumstances. Or, as Justice Souter has
put it, "[t]here are not two writs of habeas corpus for some cases and for
other cases .... [T]he rights that may be asserted, the rights that may be
vindicated, will vary with the circumstances, but jurisdiction over
habeas corpus is jurisdiction over habeas corpus."'"
The remaining question is whether the point of departure between
these two views produces a distinction worth a difference. After all, if
the Boumediene majority was correct that the Guantinamo detainees
possess no rights capable of enforcement on the merits (a point with
which I strongly disagree, but will assume for the sake of argument), the
difference between Judge Randolph's view of the Suspension Clause
and Judge Rogers's is the difference between a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction and a dismissal on the merits.
In a future article, I take up the broader question of which this is
but a small piece-whether the Constitution protects a right of access to
the courts even in cases where the plaintiff is bound to lose. 82 For now,
though, the operative point is that it is simply incorrect to conclude, as
the Boumediene majority did, that the Suspension Clause "does not
apply" to the Guantdinamo detainees because they are noncitizens
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. If the Suspension
Clause applies to anyone, it applies to (and empowers) Congress. The
"right" to habeas corpus is the right to nothing less than the writ as it
existed in 1789 (or an adequate and effective substitute), and perhaps
something far greater. 83 Unless the writ of habeas corpus, then, was
categorically unavailable to noncitizens overseas at common law-and
the absence of relevant case law does not itself answer this question-
181. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 39, at 59.
182. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers (Nov. 26, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
183. The notion that the Suspension Clause protects the writ "as it existed in 1789" is only a
constitutional floor. There are a number of arguments in support of the conclusion that the scope
of the Clause has expanded drastically throughout American constitutional history, as (and
because) the scope of the common-law writ has itself broadened. I do not mean to rehash those
arguments here, although their relevance should be fairly obvious-if Congress has no power
(other than the suspension power) to preclude whatever writ is protected by the common law, then
identifying the contemporary parameters of the common law becomes an essential inquiry, its
difficulty notwithstanding.
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then the MCA interferes with the common-law writ, and can only do so
if it is a valid exercise of Congress's Suspension Clause power.
V. CONCLUSION
"After 165 years of constitutional history," one commentator
observed in 1952, "one might expect that there would be few remaining
areas of uncertainty as to the meaning and effect of the suspension
clause. However, . . . this expectation is far from the truth."'1 4 Nor
have the ensuing decades done much to provide further illumination.1
8 5
Instead, what is perhaps most remarkable about the fundamental consti-
tutional questions raised by Boumediene and the rest of the Guantdinamo
cases is that they are open questions in the first place. For as much as
has been written about the Suspension Clause,8 6 especially lately, 87 the
answers to some of the central questions about one of the Constitution's
most important provisions remain unsettled.
The central purpose of this essay has been to suggest that, at least
with respect to the Suspension Clause, the contemporary debate is sim-
ply focusing on the wrong question. The Suspension Clause is unique
among constitutional provisions in that it is a provision meant to secure
a preexisting common-law right while identifying those circumstances
where the right may be unabridged, without actually creating the right
anew. Thus, the temptation to characterize the Suspension Clause as
conferring a "structural right," as with the temptation to characterize the
Clause as not protecting noncitizens overseas, is understandable, if
misplaced.
The Suspension Clause is an affirmative grant of power to Con-
gress to do away with the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus only in
certain delineated circumstances. Where the privilege is otherwise
available-i.e., at least where it would have been available in 1789, and
184. Collings, supra note 47, at 335.
185. Cf Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[I]t has become something of
a time-honored tradition for the Supreme Court and lower federal courts to find that Congress did
not intend to preclude altogether judicial review of constitutional claims in light of the serious due
process concerns that such preclusion would raise.") (footnote omitted).
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
187. It would be impossible to exhaustively list even those articles published in the last two
years containing significant discussions of the Suspension Clause. For a representative sampling
of recent writings, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,
Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARv. L. REv. 2029 (2007); Brian M. Hoffstadt,
The Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Habeas, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 1125 (2005); James E.
Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on Terror, 91 CORNELL L. REv.
497 (2006); Steven Semararo, Two Theories of Habeas Corpus, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 1233 (2006);
Amanda Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REv. 333 (2006); and Tor
Ekeland, Note, Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, of the United States
Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1475 (2005).
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probably in a broader class of cases today-the Constitution requires
that some court, federal or state, be available to entertain lawsuits seek-
ing the Great Writ. After all, as Justice Jackson suggested in a well-
known 1951 speech at the University of Buffalo Law School, the "sus-
pension of [the] privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is in effect a
suspension of every other liberty."'' 88 Such drastic action should only be
possible where the Constitution expressly so provides. As a unanimous
Court wrote almost a half-century ago,
Over the centuries [habeas corpus] has been the common law world's
'freedom writ' by whose orderly processes the production of a pris-
oner in court may be required and the legality of the grounds for his
incarceration inquired into, failing which the prisoner is set free. We
repeat what has been so truly said of the federal writ: 'there is no
higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired,' and unsuspended, save
only in the cases specified in our Constitution.' 89
188. Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BuFF. L. REv. 103, 109
(1951).
189. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712-13 (1961) (citation omitted).
